BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//ox.ac.uk//NONSGML oxford.event//EN
X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/London
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:Europe/London
X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/London
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
DTSTART:19700329T010000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=3
TZNAME:BST
TZOFFSETFROM:+0000
TZOFFSETTO:+0100
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
DTSTART:19701025T020000
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=10
TZNAME:GMT
TZOFFSETFROM:+0100
TZOFFSETTO:+0000
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
SUMMARY:Paternalistic Mechanisms
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260522T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260522T121500
DTSTAMP:20260512T062410Z
UID:2097d98d-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T140021Z
DESCRIPTION:Many economic transactions are banned or regulated due to pate
 rnalistic considerations. We incorporate paternalistic motives into a mech
 anism design framework. A planner seeks to organize trade between a contin
 uum of buyers and sellers with private information about their valuation f
 or a good. The planner's normative assessment of each transaction might di
 ffer from the agents' decision utility\, as she believes that individuals 
 do not act in their best interest. We axiomatize a class of social welfare
  functions that reflect paternalistic concerns\, and shows how it captures
  several popular models of behavioral bias. A key determinant of the optim
 al mechanism is whether the social planner's paternalistic motives preserv
 e the ordering between agents with heterogenous valuations for the good. W
 hen it does\, a ``sin tax'' is optimal and achieves the first-best. Otherw
 ise\, the optimal mechanism may ration one side of the market or even proh
 ibit transactions\, even when gains from trade exist under complete inform
 ation. We discuss applications to repugnant markets and the regulation of 
 sin goods.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260424T150721Z
LOCATION:Manor Road Building - Seminar Room G\, Seminar Room G Manor Road 
 Building Manor Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 3UQ United Kingdom
SPEAKER:Julien Combe (École Polytechnique / CREST)
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR