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SUMMARY:Is Ethical Divestment Possible?
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260625T170000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260625T183000
DTSTAMP:20260614T180417Z
UID:22f5e872-a34f-f111-bec6-7ced8d6bf634
CREATED:20260514T144452Z
DESCRIPTION:Title: Is Ethical Divestment Possible?\n\n A common justificat
 ion for ethical divestment rests on the claim that your owning stock in an
  immoral company makes you complicit in the company’s immoral behavior. 
 But there’s something puzzling about this view. Suppose you own such sto
 ck. Ethical divestment requires you to sell it. If you sell it to someone\
 , then they’ll own it. If it’s wrong to own the stock\, then they’ll
  be doing something wrong. So if you sell someone the stock you own in an 
 immoral company\, you’ll be helping them do something wrong. And it seem
 s wrong to help someone do something wrong. This seems to make it wrong fo
 r you to sell the stock to them. How\, then\, can a company’s immoral be
 havior make it wrong for you to own stock in the company but not make it w
 rong for you to get rid of the stock by selling it to someone else? How\, 
 in short\, can ethical divestment be possible? I will discuss a variety of
  answers that have been offered to this puzzling question and propose an a
 lternative response.\n\n\nProfessor Boonin’s interests lie in the areas 
 of applied ethics\, ethical theory\, and the history of ethics. He is the 
 author of Thomas Hobbes and the Science of Moral Virtue (Cambridge Univers
 ity Press 1994)\, A Defense of Abortion (Cambridge University Press\, 2003
 )\, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge University Press\, 2008) Should R
 ace Matter? (Cambridge University Press\, 2011)\, The Non-Identity Problem
  and the Ethics of Future People (Oxford University Press\, 2014) and Beyo
 nd Roe: Why Abortion Should be Legal Even if the Fetus is a Person (Oxford
  University Press\, 2019)\, and Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm 
 (Oxford University Press\, 2019)\, and Sexual Ethics and Problematic Conse
 nt (Oxford University Press\, 2024)\, as well as a number of articles on s
 uch subjects as animal rights\, euthanasia\, same-sex marriage\, and our m
 oral obligations to future generations.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260612T135036Z
LOCATION:Rewley House - Lecture Theatre\, Lecture Theatre Rewley House 1-7
  Wellington Square Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 2JA United Kingdom
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