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SUMMARY:Rational Voter Learning\, Issue Alignment\, and Polarization
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260508T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260508T121500
DTSTAMP:20260508T151910Z
UID:3496d98d-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T135746Z
DESCRIPTION:We model electoral competition between two parties when voters
  can rationally learn about their political positions through flexible inf
 ormation acquisition. Rational voter learning generates polarized and alig
 ned political preferences\, even when voters’ true positions are unimoda
 lly distributed and independent across policy issues. When parties strateg
 ically select their positions to influence voter learning\, party and vote
 r polarization increase as information costs decline\, and parties may ado
 pt positions more extreme than their ideal policies. These results arise f
 rom two new forces introduced by endogenous voter learning: parties gain f
 rom moderating to skew learning in their favor\, but the more extreme part
 y also gains from differentiating to trigger more voter learning.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260424T150712Z
LOCATION:Manor Road Building - Seminar Room G\, Seminar Room G Manor Road 
 Building Manor Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 3UQ United Kingdom
SPEAKER:Martin Vaeth (Paris School of Economics)
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