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SUMMARY:Exploitation Payoffs and Incentives for Exploration
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260619T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260619T121500
DTSTAMP:20260512T062405Z
UID:62e0e299-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T140358Z
DESCRIPTION:We study optimal contracting for innovation projects involving
  an initial exploration stage followed by exploitation\, integrating the e
 xperimentation literature with dynamic corporate finance. The shape of the
  exploitation payoff frontier — not just its level — determines the op
 timal exploration contract and the duration of experimentation. When the e
 xploitation stage involves moral hazard and limited liability\, the princi
 pal's payoff is inverted-U shaped in the agent's continuation utility. In 
 particular\, the agent's incentive constraints may be slack during the exp
 loration stage\, which affects compensation dynamics and can reduce ineffi
 ciencies from under-experimentation. Applications to corporate governance 
 and innovation subsidy design yield sharp policy prescriptions.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260504T133936Z
LOCATION:Manor Road Building - Seminar Room G\, Seminar Room G Manor Road 
 Building Manor Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 3UQ United Kingdom
SPEAKER:William Fuchs (UT Austin McCombs / Carlos III Madrid)
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