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SUMMARY:Creating Experts
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260602T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260602T140000
DTSTAMP:20260512T062408Z
UID:8897d98d-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T140123Z
DESCRIPTION:An expert whose preferences are aligned with those of the deci
 sion maker may exert hidden costly effort to learn about the payoff-releva
 nt state of nature. The decision maker (principal) can incentivize the exp
 ert to refine his signal using either information design or delegation. Sh
 e can also pay him to participate\, but other message- or action-contingen
 t transfers are not feasible. We characterize the solution to each problem
  under general conditions. Optimal\, effort-inducing delegation excludes a
 ctions near the `status quo' (the ideal point under the common prior)\, wh
 ereas receiver-led information design restricts the sender's ability to le
 arn about the state near its prior mean. Extremes-refining bi-pooling expe
 riments emerge in both solutions. The two schemes are not equivalent as th
 e former distorts actions whereas the latter coarsens information. We obta
 in sharp results concerning which scheme is preferred by the principal: in
 formation design beats optimal delegation when the expert's marginal cost 
 of information-refinement is high and vice versa.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260504T131514Z
LOCATION:Nuffield College - Butler Room\, Butler Room Nuffield College New
  Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 1NF United Kingdom
SPEAKER:Peter Eso
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