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SUMMARY:Competing Powers
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260515T110000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260515T121500
DTSTAMP:20260512T062411Z
UID:b296d98d-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T135921Z
DESCRIPTION:Motivated by the growing interest in geoeconomics\, we develop
  a formal framework in which multiple superpowers—such as the United Sta
 tes and China—compete to shape the behavior of less powerful countries o
 r firms. We model superpowers as competing principals who influence an age
 nt’s policy choice by threatening costly punishments. We characterize th
 e set of equilibrium policy choices as a system of incentive-compatibility
  constraints on each actor. Equilibrium policy choices tend to favor more 
 powerful principals\, and larger policy concessions can be extracted when 
 principals are more aligned. When all parties additionally have access to 
 frictionless transfers\, Coasian surplus-maximizing equilibria always exis
 t regardless of the distribution of punishment power\, with power impactin
 g only the division of surplus. However\, this result no longer holds if f
 rictions are introduced.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260427T124156Z
LOCATION:Manor Road Building - Seminar Room G\, Seminar Room G Manor Road 
 Building Manor Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 3UQ United Kingdom
SPEAKER:Andrea Prat (Columbia Business School)
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