BEGIN:VCALENDAR VERSION:2.0 PRODID:-//ox.ac.uk//NONSGML oxford.event//EN X-WR-TIMEZONE:Europe/London BEGIN:VTIMEZONE TZID:Europe/London X-LIC-LOCATION:Europe/London BEGIN:DAYLIGHT DTSTART:19700329T010000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=3 TZNAME:BST TZOFFSETFROM:+0000 TZOFFSETTO:+0100 END:DAYLIGHT BEGIN:STANDARD DTSTART:19701025T020000 RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYDAY=-1SU;BYMONTH=10 TZNAME:GMT TZOFFSETFROM:+0100 TZOFFSETTO:+0000 END:STANDARD END:VTIMEZONE BEGIN:VEVENT SUMMARY:Emerging Issues in International Political Economy and Global Gove rnance DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T140000 DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260513T160000 DTSTAMP:20260512T071821Z UID:df351454-e13f-f111-88b5-6045bd12f634 CREATED:20260424T132730Z DESCRIPTION:Louis W. Pauly\, University of Toronto \nInsurance as Global G overnance: Entanglements and Aspirations at the Risk Frontier\nOf the sect ors comprising global capital markets\, insurance has received relatively little attention from scholars of international politics. New social conve ntions and financial instruments arising from the invention of probabilist ic reasoning and the discovery of risk began to spread around the world on ly a few centuries ago. They disciplined speculative impulses\, promoted e conomic development and integration\, and fostered political transformatio n and societal resilience. Over time\, the logic and language of insurance proved useful in defending and expanding the fiscal authority of the stat e as well as in justifying the pooling of sovereignty in nascent federatio ns. On this point\, pioneering research in the field of political sociolog y demonstrated how the insurance industry had come in the modern era to fu nction as a key instrument of governance in industrial and post-industrial societies\, which effectively resulted in the assignment of priority to m arket-liberal over other social values. During the twentieth century\, lea ding states appealed to the logic of risk mutualization and insurance as t hey designed some of the institutional architecture of regional and global economic order. Limited co-insurance facilities were supplemented at poin ts of emergency by massive ad hoc reinsurance arrangements combining priva te as well as public interests and resources. Today\, the very idea of suc h policy instruments attracts mounting resistance. When the siren song of self-reliance once again rings out from the governments of states overwhel med by populist and mercantilist pressures\, the risks of systemic fragmen tation grow. At the same time\, the causes of fairness and sustainability appear to be in retreat around the world. In such a context\, and especial ly at the frontier where evident global risks meet mounting uncertainty\, it is worth thinking more deeply and pragmatically about the ways in which new forms of insurance might help promote global stability and distributi ve justice. The paper provides summary notes on Lou’s latest book\, Insu ring States in an Uncertain World: Towards the Collaborative Government of Complex Risks\, Cambridge University Press\, 2025. \n\n \nKrzysztof Pel c\, University of Oxford\, Department of Politics and International Relati ons\nSelf-Binding for Souls and States\nBinding institutions such as const itutions and international treaties are commonly justified as responses to political passions: they restrain future governments against short-term t emptation. At the individual level\, rational actors who recognize their o wn susceptibility to temptation are likewise expected to seek out commitme nt devices that constrain their future choices. This article asks whether these intuitions align in practice. Are individuals who experience intrape rsonal conflict more attuned to political time-inconsistency? And does suc h awareness translate into greater support for institutional constraint? D rawing on an original survey conducted in the US and UK (n=3\,428)\, I sho w that inner conflict and attitudes towards political self-binding are ind eed linked—but in a strikingly inverted way. Individuals who report grea ter intrapersonal conflict are systematically less supportive of self-impo sed rules\, regulatory interventions\, constitutional constraints\, and bi nding international agreements. Far from generating demand for commitment\ , greater reported weakness of will appears to undermine it. Retrospective regret is a stronger (negative) predictor of support for political self-b inding than perceptions of political temptation itself. Experimental evide nce further reveals a directional linkage between the self and the state. Priming intrapersonal conflict increases recognition of political time-inc onsistency\, while the reverse does not hold. Together\, these findings ch allenge a foundational assumption in political economy—that insight into temptation produces demand for commitment—and raise questions about the democratic foundations of institutional self-binding.\n\nJörg Friedrichs \, University of Oxford\, Department of International Development\nAn Infr astructure View of AI Governance\nArtificial intelligence (AI) is as disru ptive as any other technology that has unleashed an industrial revolution\ , from steam engines to automobiles and from electromagnetism to computing . Unsurprisingly\, therefore\, governance and regulation are lagging behin d. In past industrial revolutions\, they have similarly lagged behind but came into their own when the technologies in question entered the infrastr ucture stage. We explore how and why\, in past industrial revolutions\, go vernance and regulation have coincided with the infrastructure stage. We s hould expect the same for the fourth industrial revolution\, which is comm only associated with the advent of artificial intelligence. AI has already become highly infrastructural\, as exemplified by data centers and cloud computing\, which necessitate access to optical fiber networks and abundan t power generation. Open-source platforms are another significant case in point. All of this offers ample opportunities for governance and regulatio n. Given its pragmatic approach\, China is already pursuing these opportun ities. Decision makers in the West and elsewhere should also take an infra structure view of AI governance.\n\nJai Bhatia\, University of Oxford\, De partment of International Development\nDigital Public Infrastructure and G lobal Governance: Opportunities\, Risks\, and the Indian Model\n\nDigital Public Infrastructure (DPI) refers to foundational\, interoperable digital systems such as digital identity\, payments\, and data exchange layers th at enable governments\, businesses\, and citizens to interact efficiently and inclusively. Increasingly recognized as a cornerstone of modern state capacity\, DPI is being adopted or explored by over 50 countries\, with st rong endorsement from multilateral institutions such as the G20\, World Ba nk\, and UN. Its rapid diffusion signals a structural shift\, as DPI emerg es not just as a technological upgrade but as a governance paradigm shapin g how states deliver services\, regulate economies\, and exercise authorit y in the digital age.\nThis paper draws on India as a central case study t o examine the evolution and implications of DPI. India’s “India Stack\ ,” particularly Aadhaar and the Unified Payments Interface (UPI)\, illus trates both the scale and transformative potential of such systems. Aadhaa r has enrolled over a billion individuals\, enabling streamlined access to welfare and public services\, while UPI has reshaped retail payments by p rocessing billions of transactions monthly at minimal cost. Together\, the se platforms illustrate how DPI can reconfigure state capacity and authori ty\, raising critical governance questions around data control\, regulator y oversight\, and accountability\, particularly as they extend beyond nati onal borders through cross-border payment linkages and international partn erships. At the same time\, insufficient governance risks accelerating the financialisation of everyday life\, where fintech actors leverage DPI rai ls to aggressively market credit\, loans\, and financial products\, potent ially exacerbating indebtedness\, consumer vulnerability\, and systemic ri sk in the absence of robust regulatory safeguards. These dynamics highligh t broader governance challenges. DPI concentrates control over data\, iden tity\, and financial flows\, raising concerns around surveillance\, privac y\, exclusion\, and cybersecurity\, while its global diffusion is reconfig uring the financial landscape\, as emerging systems challenge entrenched n etworks and advance competing visions of digital sovereignty within an inc reasingly multipolar order. The paper argues that robust governance framew orks are essential to ensure that DPI remains inclusive\, secure\, and acc ountable. As DPI becomes embedded in global systems\, its governance will shape not only economic outcomes but also the future balance between state power\, individual rights\, and international cooperation. LAST-MODIFIED:20260427T103229Z LOCATION:Queen Elizabeth House - Seminar Room 1\, Seminar Room 1 Queen Eli zabeth House 4 Mansfield Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 3TB United Kingdom SPEAKER:Professor Louis W Pauly (University of Toronto)\, Professor Krzysz tof Pelc (University of Oxford)\, Professor Jörg Friedrichs (University o f Oxford)\, Dr Jai Bhatia (University of Oxford) END:VEVENT END:VCALENDAR