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SUMMARY:Optimal Rating Design under Moral Hazard
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/London:20260519T124500
DTEND;TZID=Europe/London:20260519T140000
DTSTAMP:20260512T071922Z
UID:e096d98d-6219-f111-8342-7c1e522d9057
CREATED:20260306T135947Z
DESCRIPTION:We study optimal rating design under moral hazard and strategi
 c manipulation. An intermediary observes a noisy indicator of effort and c
 ommits to a rating policy that shapes market beliefs and pay. We character
 ize optimal ratings via concavification of a gain function. Optimal rating
 s depends on interaction of effort and risk: for activities that raise tai
 l risk\, optimal ratings exhibit lower censorship\, pooling poor outcomes 
 to insure and encourage risk-taking\; for activities that reduce tail risk
 \, upper censorship increases penalties for negligence. In multi-task envi
 ronments with window dressing\, less informative ratings deter manipulatio
 n. In redistributive test design\, optimal tests exhibit mid censorship.
LAST-MODIFIED:20260424T144854Z
LOCATION:Nuffield College - Butler Room\, Butler Room Nuffield College New
  Road Oxford Oxfordshire OX1 1NF United Kingdom
SPEAKER:Maryam Saaedi
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